Parallax View: I don’t think we are at a Thailand-like crossroads yet

While the world is focused on Greece and what the impending collapse of its economy will mean for Europe and

on the civil war in Libya, developments in Thailand seem to have passed largely unnoticed. Even Indian journos who were so quick to hail the furore surrounding the

Jantar Mantar protests as India’s Tahrir Square moment seem to have missed a more fitting parallel to our own situation: the turmoil that led to the election in Thailand last week.

 

   Thai politics is too complicated to explain in a few paras but I’ll try anyway. Throughout the Eighties, when India languished, the countries of South East Asia grew at a rapid pace. Such nations as Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia came to be called the Asian Tigers and it was embarrassing, if you were an Indian, to visit their gleaming cities and look at the contrast with our own country.

 

   Eventually, 20 years later, India caught up and because of our size will end up far eclipsing these small countries. But one effect of the years of high growth and prosperity in the Asian tigers was the creation of an urban elite which saw itself as being the equal of the world’s finest. In such countries as Thailand, the urban elite (which we would call the educated middle class) prospered at the expense of the rural poor who did not share equally in the fruits of the new affluence.

 

   This was fine as long as Thailand was run by the military with puppet civilian governments but as middle class confidence grew, there were street protests against military rule and eventually, democracy took hold. The early elections threw up shaky coalition governments but it never really mattered because Thailand – like Italy perhaps – has managed what India cannot: economic growth is quite unrelated to political instability or stability.

 

   The democratic structure seemed like a blessing for the urban elite till Thaksin Shinawatra emerged. Thaksin is Thailand’s richest man. A former police officer, his fortune is self-made and from all accounts, his rise to wealth was facilitated by corruption and influence peddling. The urban elite was prepared to tolerate his billionaire-status but alarm bells went off when Thaksin launched his own political party. His appeal was not to the urban elite and the professionals who had gained from the economic boom but to the rural poor and the have-nots. His brand of populism was so successful that his party swept the polls and he became Prime Minister.

 

   Since then – about a decade or so – Thai politics has been about the clash between Thaksin and the urban elite. The middle class says he is corrupt and loathes his politics. Thaksin says he is no more corrupt than previous rulers of Thailand (including the army) and argues that the middle class does not like him only because he represents the have-nots.

 

   Over the last decade, everybody with influence has turned against Thaksin. He was ousted once in a military coup. The courts have unseated his nominees. Middle class activists (so-called representatives of civil society) shut down Bangkok airport for two weeks a few years ago to protest his party’s corruption. And so on.

 

   Thaksin fled into exile (in Dubai) but his largely poor supporters have hit back. Last year, they camped in the middle of Bangkok’s prime shopping district for weeks till they were driven out by the army. Despite these clashes, Thaksin has been sanguine about his prospects. Whatever the press may say, he knows that his support base is intact.

 

   A few days ago, we had dramatic confirmation of that. Thaksin’s party, led by his sister (Thaksin was still in Dubai) swept the polls again, winning an overall majority. The middle class opposition had amounted to nothing.

 

   At one level, the Thaksin saga is just a South-East Asian soap opera. But at another, more significant level, it shows us the nature of the clash between educated, prosperous elites and the poor, uneducated masses that is fast becoming the hallmark of Asian democracy.

 

"The answer, therefore, is for the government to take the middle class seriously, to address its concerns and to appear open to criticism and transparent in its functioning."

   Thaksin’s primary opponent, the outgoing Prime Minister is a decent, well-meaning fellow, educated at Eton and Oxford. His supporters are also well-educated and forward-thinking. But they can’t really win elections – at least not in the way that Thaksin can.

 

   Three or four years ago, when opposition to Thaksin was at its height, Bangkok was full of ‘pro-democracy’ protesters who wanted the vote to be restricted to those with college degrees (or at least a high school education). Or, they suggested a parliamentary system where a large chunk of MPs would be chosen from civil society not elected by the full electorate.

 

   Neither idea took off – the military took over instead – but in the wake of Thaksin’s party’s victory, the middle class must be wishing that it had succeeded in reforming the system.

 

   I have outlined the situation in Thai terms but it is one that many Third World democracies confront as prosperity rises. When there is a small middle class, it doesn’t matter so much. The tiny elite provides leadership to the masses and the democratic system functions without protest.

 

   But once the middle class grows, as a consequence of prosperity, then the crisis begins. If development is lopsided – which it often is – with the rich and the middle class benefiting while the rural power are left out, then the crisis becomes more acute. A tiny political elite will know how to win votes from the electorate, the bulk of which will be poor and uneducated. The middle class will be articulate, loud, indignant and relatively large – but not large enough to make a difference at elections.

 

   So while the urban elite will control the media, will talk to the foreign press, will pull the levers of the economy, will parlay in equal terms with the West etc., it will find itself entirely cut off from political power. It can rave, it can rant, it can fast, it can demonstrate – but ultimately political power will still reside with those who can win the votes of the majority of the electorate.

 

   I don’t think we are at a Thailand-like crossroads yet.  We have no Thaksin. The army plays no role in politics. And the gulf between the urban elite and the rural poor has not reached the stage where the shutting of airports, the forcible occupation of the capital’s centre etc. are regular events.

 

   But it would be crazy to deny that what we have witnessed over the last year is analogous to the divide that has dominated Thai politics. As the Indian middle class has grown richer and more confident, it has demanded a share of political power and asked politicians to be more accountable to civil society (which, basically, is just another term for the middle class). Its anger has been partly provoked by frustration. In the West, the middle class can simply vote out a corrupt or unresponsive government. But in the Third World, middle class opinion counts for much less at elections.  It is the masses – who are not articulate, do not have access to the media, do not post comments on the internet and have not prospered over the last decade – who elect governments.

 

   The best parallel therefore, is not with Tahrir Square where the protests were against a sham democracy but with Thailand where the clash between electorally successful politicians and the middle class has been amplified by the nature of universal franchise.

 

   No country can survive on the basis of middle class opinion alone. But equally no democratic government can flourish if it ignores middle class opinion and takes the line that only the rural masses matter – unless our leaders want to go down the Thaksin road.

 

   The answer, therefore, is for the government to take the middle class seriously, to address its concerns and to appear open to criticism and transparent in its functioning.

 

   So far, at least, India’s UPA government has not learnt that lesson.