Any summit that does not attempt to obtain answers is a waste of time and money

Peaceniks keep telling us that the India-Pakistan peace process is just that – a process not an event.

Despite my concerns about the inbuilt limitations to this process – outlined on these pages recently – I have no quarrel with this position.

 

   But the truth is that all too often it is the diplomats and the peaceniks who focus too much on an event and forget all about the process.

 

   Something like that happens with India-Pakistan summits. So much preparation goes into these summits – Track II meetings, bureaucratic consensus over the agenda, informal agreements between officials on both sides etc – and each meeting is preceded by so much hype (media parties accompany the foreign ministers, press conferences are scheduled etc) that despite all their pious claims about processes versus events, diplomats focus too much on the summit itself.

 

   Because so much has been invested in that one event, diplomats bend over backwards to ensure that the summit is a success. When it fails – as the meeting between the two foreign ministers did – then frustration results in a search for scapegoats and excuses.

 

   In the process, they forget why we went to the summit in the first place.

 

   None of us seriously disputes that it is a good idea to keep talking to Pakistan. It makes sense to keep at least one door slightly ajar even if nothing very much results from the exchanges.

 

   But why do we want to talk? Well, for most of us the most important factor is terrorism. The west tells us that the Pakistanis are serious about cracking down on terrorism. Our own Prime Minister has so much faith in Pakistan’s good intentions that he even set up a joint mechanism so that we could fight terror together.

 

   And yet, despite everything we hear, the reality is that terrorists continue to be trained on Pakistani soil and sent across the border. The confession of Ajmal Kasab leaves us in no doubt that 26/11 was a Pakistani operation. And the Americans themselves have confirmed to us that David Headley told his interrogators that Pakistani militant groups were behind terrorism in India. Our own investigators say that Headley claimed that ISI was involved in the planning of 26/11.

 

   When Pakistani politicians talk to India – or even when they talk to the US – they say that Pakistan is also a victim of terrorism and that the same militant groups are also spreading mayhem in Pakistani cities. They may not be strong enough to stamp out the terrorists but they certainly intend to try.

 

   Given this background, the most important item on the agenda at any summit must surely be terrorism. Why is there such a gulf between the claims made by Pakistani leaders and the reality on the ground? Why is Hafiz Syed, identified by Kasab and so many others as the mastermind behind 26/11, still at large? Why are the Pakistanis so unwilling to take our dossiers seriously? If the Pakistanis believe that we extract confessions from terrorists through torture and get them to say whatever we want, then do they have the same objections to confessions obtained by their American allies? Because all the evidence about the Pakistani role in 26/11 provided by Headley to his American interrogators cannot be dismissed so easily.

 

"Diplomats may care about summits and their success. But we care about terrorism. And the only success that matters to us is success in the battle against terrorists."

   From the perspective of most Indians, the only reason we want to talk to Pakistan is to get answers to these questions. We need to know what the truth is. Is the civilian government lying to us? Is it incapable of reining in the terrorists? Is it a mere cipher which makes meaningless statements while real power resides with the army? Should we attach any importance to Pakistani statements? Or should we simply prepare a military response?

 

   Any summit that does not attempt to obtain answers to these questions is a waste of time and money.

 

   The Pakistanis wanted the summit to result in a time-bound solution to the Siachen and Sir Creek disputes. But I doubt if most Indians give a damn about either dispute. We don’t really care when Sir Creek is resolved and Siachen is at the periphery of our consciousness. Our concern is more immediate: will Pakistan cooperate in the battle against terrorism?

 

   I suspect our diplomats already know the answer to the big question. They know that Pakistan is too complicated a society for any commitment in the battle against terror to be meaningful. Even if Asif Ali Zardari wants to act against terrorist organizations, it is not clear that his own prime minister will listen to him. If the prime minister is sincere, it is not clear that the army shares his commitment to fighting terror. And even if the civilian government and the army are united in their resolve to combat terror, there is no evidence to suggest that they can rein in renegade officers within their own ranks let alone the former ISI grandees and retired generals who now run private armies and sponsor terror groups. A government that cannot protect its own cities is hardly in a position to offer to help protect ours.

 

   Because the answers to the questions we want to ask are not the ones that will go down well in India, our diplomats and peaceniks take the let’s-release-some-fishermen-and-discuss-Sir-Creek-again route. Some tiny signs of progress will be read into so-called confidence building measures and the summit will be deemed a success, a new beginning in Indo-Pak relations. (We’ve had about 15 new beginnings so far.)

 

   But reality has an unpleasant habit of intruding into this diplomatic fantasy. Even as our officials were discussing cultural exchanges and the fate of fishermen, the people charged with protecting India from terror were being cross-questioned by those they are supposed to protect. The Home Secretary was asked what the government had learned from its interrogation of David Headley and he gave an honest answer: Headley had said that 26/11 was an ISI operation.

 

   The Pakistanis used this claim to torpedo the summit. Shockingly, even the Indian side seems to have accepted this position. Our Foreign Minister has told interviewers that even if what the Home Secretary said was right, it should not have been said on the eve of the summit.

 

   My question is: why not?

 

   Why are we bothering to hold these summits anyway? For most of us, the principal motivation is the hope that dialogue will lead to some reduction in the level of the terrorism we import from Pakistan. Sir Creek, Siachen, trade, captured fishermen and a liberal visa regime are mere side shows. Terrorism is the big one.

 

   And yet, we now find ourselves in a situation where the success of a summit is considered more important than the battle against Pakistani-inspired terrorism. The Home Secretary must tell lies only so that the two foreign ministers can come to some meaningless agreement over some side show at some meaningless summit.

 

   Most Indians are appalled. Diplomats may care about summits and their success. But we care about terrorism. And the only success that matters to us is success in the battle against terrorists.

 

   And that’s not forthcoming.