Vinita Kamte’s book exposes the rot at the heart of the police force

The more we learn about the events of 26/11, the less we know.

We are aware now of who perpetrated and planned the attacks --- thanks largely to Ajmal Kasab --- but we know less than we should about other aspects of 26/11.

 

   We know even less about the response of the Bombay police. Why did the police force react so lamely for a whole night? Why did virtually nobody take on the terrorists? Why were Kasab and his partner allowed to fire at random at VT Station and then stroll out without being challenged? Had it not been for ASI Ombale who apprehended Kasab, the record of the Bombay police would have been truly shameful, or so it seems.

 

   Whatever new information is now emerging shows the Bombay police in an even worse light. There is, first of all, Hasan Gafoor’s claim that, as Police Commissioner, he found that four of his officers refused to risk their lives that night. And now there is Vinita Kamte’s deeply moving book.

 

   I did not know anything about Ashok Kamte and have never met his wife Vinita, but it is hard to read her book without feeling both tearful and enraged by a police system that first cost a brave officer his life – and then tried to cover up the truth.

 

   I do not necessarily accept Vinita’s implication that one of those responsible for the mess on the night of 26/11, was Rakesh Maria, one of Bombay’s best-known cops (the torturer who is glorified in Suketu Mehta’s Maximum City is said to be based on Mr Maria), but the case she makes out is so strong that there should be some kind of independent inquiry into the incident.

 

   All of us know that Ashok Kamte, Hemant Karkare and Vijay Salaskar were killed on the night of 26/11. The version we have been fed is that these two top officers (Salaskar was not from the IPS) behaved like headless chickens driving around recklessly on the streets of Bombay and that they were easy pickings for the terrorists.

 

   Vinita’s book proves that this version is a lie.

 

   First of all, Ashok Kamte was not merely driving around. He was in charge of the East zone so the attacks were outside his area. He was called, first to the Trident by Hasan Gafoor and then, to the Special Branch Office near the spot where the terrorists were firing. (One of the ironies of 26/11 is that the worst mayhem took place a stone’s throw from the headquarters of the Bombay Police!)

 

   Secondly, Kamte and Karkare were not together. Karkare had heard about the firing at VT Station and reached there independently. Witnesses told him that the terrorists had left and had now reached Cama Hospital.

 

   Karkare radioed the Central Room at 2324hrs (11.24pm): “We need to encircle Cama Hospital. We are near SB2 Office Side. Send a team to the front side of the Cama Hospital. This needs to be coordinated so that there is no cross-firing. Similarly, Mr Prasad, who is there ---- ask him to request the army for their commandos.”

 

   So, at 11.24pm, the Chief of the State’s Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) had (a) already worked out that this was a terror strike when much of the police force was confused, (b) had asked for commandos and (c) had planned to encircle Cama Hospital to flush out the terrorists. Guess what happened? All his requests were ignored. No re-inforcements reached Cama Hospital. Nothing he said was passed on.

 

   Why was this? After all, police headquarters are only two minutes from Cama Hospital.

 

   There has been no official response from the Bombay police. As it turned out, because there were no policemen at the front gate of Cama Hospital, Kasab and Ismail, his partner, simply strolled out of the hospital. They walked to the corner of the nearby Rang Bhavan Lane where they ran into a lone Inspector of police and shot him dead.

 

   Then, they walked into Rang Bhavan Lane. On the way in, they shot at a passing Honda City, hitting the driver in his finger. Two constables from the Azad Maidan police station saw the incident clearly and informed their Control Room at 23:45. At around the same time, residents of Rang Bhavan Lane who had seen the shooting also called the Control Room.

 

   Nobody in the Control Room either sent cops or even, informed Karkare of any of this. He still believed that the terrorists were inside the hospital and that re-inforcements had reached the front gate of Cama Hospital --- after all, he had radioed for men half an hour before. He decided to go to the front of Cama Hospital and took Kamte (who had an AK-47) and Salaskar (an encounter specialist) with him.

 

"The official version is that nobody knew they were there. This reflects terribly on the police force if it is true. But we can’t even be sure that it is the truth."

   At 12.01 or so, the vehicle containing Karkare, Kamte and Salaskar entered Rang Bhavan Lane. The officers thought they saw something moving in the bushes. So Kamte go out of the car and opened fire with his AK-47. He hit Kasab in the arm. But Ismail then returned the fire with his assault rifle and in the gun battle, the three men (Kamte, Karkare and Salaskar) were injured. (As, of course, was Kasab).

 

   The terrorists pulled them out of the vehicle, threw them on the road and hijacked the car. They lay there from 12.04am to 12.49am!

 

   Were they dead? Probably not. Salaskar was alive when they took him to the hospital. He died there. Kamte was shot in the shoulder but bled to death from a scalp injury. If he had not been left to die on the road for over 40 minutes, he might still be alive today.

 

   So why did the Bombay police let their best men bleed to death on a road two minutes from headquarters?

 

   The official version is that nobody knew they were there. This reflects terribly on the police force if it is true. But we can’t even be sure that it is the truth.

 

   The residents of Rang Bhavan Lane kept phoning the Control Room. Many called repeatedly, describing the terrorists, informing the cops of the fire fight and even telling them that if they sealed off the Lane, they could catch them. Nobody responded.

 

   At 12.04am right after the gun-battle involving Karkare’s team, a policeman reported the firing to the Main Control Room. At 12.25am, Arun Jhadav, who had survived the attack, called the Control Room and told them about the incident. Nothing happened.

 

   Right after the officers were shot, a police vehicle sped by --- eyewitnesses are quite clear.  But neither did it stop nor did it inform the Control Room. Another police vehicle passed at 12.33am. It told the Control Room “three people are lying in the St. Xavier’s Lane. We need a stretcher.” But it did not stop. And no help arrived for another 16 minutes!

 

   What can you say about a police force that (a) allows Kasab and Ismail to shoot dozens of people at VT, (b) refuses to implement orders from the head of the ATS to send forces to Cama Hospital to trap terrorists, (c) does not inform the ATS Chief that the terrorists have left Cama Hospital, (d) ignores reports from residents and its own men that the terrorists can be found on Rang Bhavan Lane, two minutes away from the Control Room, (e) refuses to send forces even when a gun battle is reported and (f) lets their top men bleed to death like dogs on the streets?

 

   And then, there are the lies and the politics within the force. Anybody who followed Karkare’s career as Head of the ATS will know that he was systematically bad-mouthed and undermined by the Crime Branch. One theory for the fiasco of 26/11 is that the Crime Branch officers who manned the Control Room were unwilling to help Karkare because of internal politics. Certainly, the way in which the police tried to conceal the fact that it was Kamte who injured Kasab (making it easier to capture him later) is truly contemptible.

 

   When Vinita Kamte tried to find out how her husband had died, the Bombay police simply refused to tell her the truth. Eventually, the State’s Chief Information Commissioner forced the Bombay police to part with the logs and the audio records under the Right to Information Act. That’s how we now know what happened that night.

 

   Sections of the media have treated this book as a chargesheet against Maria. That is clearly unfair. He is an extremely well-known officer and should not be judged only on the basis of a grieving widow’s inquiries. Moreover, I doubt if Vinita Kamte’s intention was to single out individuals.

 

   Her intention was to expose the rot at the heart of the police force which she has done brilliantly. Nobody who lives in Bombay can sleep well at night knowing that this is how the police fight terrorism.

 

   She also wanted to set the record straight ---- Karkare and Kamte died on the job and not out of recklessness or foolishness.

 

   Her late husband, Ashok Kamte, comes off as part of a vanishing breed: the decent middle class boy (Raj Kumar College, St. Xavier’s Bombay and St. Stephen’s Delhi) who shunned a well-paid career in the private sector because he came from a police family and believed that he could make a difference by joining the cops.

 

   What a shame that the police force let him down so badly!